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This paper aims to explore the relationships of the performance of producer responsibility organizations (PROs) for 
waste oil, waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), and end-of-life vehicles (ELV). The methodology consists 
in estimating the cointegration equations between the variables of lubricating oil production (SIG), electric and electronic 
equipment (EEE), and vehicle production (VP) using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS). Subsequently, elasticities 
are got based on estimates for Spain over the period 2007-2019 using quarterly data. The main results were that SIG and 
EEE were cointegrated variables. The elasticity of the SIG variable up to EEE was positive at 2, 4166. Additionally, the 
elasticity of the SIG variable up to VP was 2, 4050. However, SIG and VP are not cointegrated variables; subsequently, it 
was not a stable relationship between these variables. Results suggest it was because EPR was applied in WEEE PRO 
join with a deposit refund system (DRS); meanwhile, EPR in ELV PRO had been applied without subsidies to purchase 
cars. 




In the European Union, extended producer responsibility (EPR) means a set of measures that include accepting 
returned products and the waste that remains after those products have been used, and the subsequent management of 
the waste and financial responsibility for such activities1. EPR also includes organizational responsibility and 
responsibility to contribute to waste prevention and the reusability and recyclability of products. These obligations 
can be fulfilled by producers of products individually or collectively. In the latter case, producers organize collective 
EPR systems, named PROs, which fulfill EPR obligations on behalf of producers. EPR for producers and PROs 
must meet minimum general requirements to reduce costs and boost performance and ensure an equal framework for 
all producers that avoid obstacles preventing the internal market's proper functioning. 
The EPR is regulated by Directive 2008/98/EC and the EPR regimes for specific waste flows, such as those for 
WEEE, ELV, tires or batteries, and accumulators. Regarding waste oil, which in Europe applies to Directive 
2008/98/EC, in Spain, Royal Decree 679/2006 on waste oils establishing EPR in managing waste oils. For this 
purpose, Spanish waste oil regulation set the ecological objectives of collecting 95% of the waste oils generated and 
valorizing 100% of the waste oils recovered in 2006 and regenerating 55% and 65% of the recovered oils in 2007 
and 2008, respectively. The manufacturers of lubricants, to comply with the obligations arising from Royal Decree 
679/2006, established in 2007 the Integrated Management System of Waste Oil (SIGAUS), by which the lubricant 
oil producers finance the management of waste oils through their contribution to SIGAUS of 0.06 euros per kilogram 
of the industrial oil they put on the market. 
The EPR regime for WEEE is mandated by Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 27 January 2003, which repealed Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 July 
2012 on WEEE. In Spain, these Directives are transposed by the Royal Decree 208/2005, of 25 February and Royal 
Decree 110/2015, of 20 February, on WEEE, respectively. The EEE producers have constituted different WEEE 
PROs, currently grouped in OfiRaee (AMBILAMP, Ecoasimelec, Ecofimática, Ecolum, Ecolec, Eco-Raee's, Ecotic 
and European Recycling Platform), as well as the PROs REINICIA Foundation Canaria for the Reciclaje and 
                                                             
1 Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2018 modified the Waste Directive 
2008/98/EC. Law 22/2011, 28 July, on Waste and Contaminated Soils transposed Directive 2008/98/EC. 
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Development and SUNREUSE. Currently, OfiRaee coordinates the operation of the different WEEE PROs, allowing 
traceability of waste in all autonomous communities. 
Royal Decree 20/2017, of 20 January, on ELV, updates the EPR regime for ELV, established by Directive 
2000/53/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 18 September 2000 on ELV, which transposed in Spain 
by Royal Decree 1383/2002 of 20 December on ELV. Vehicle producers are responsible for the vehicles they have 
placed on the market regarding decontamination and processing if they have carried out no prior disassembly of 
parts or components (Art 5 Royal Decree 20/2017). At the same time, avoiding double regulation and financing, 
waste generated over the life cycle of vehicles is mandated by Law 22/2011 of 28 July and the actual specific 
decrees for waste streams (tires, waste oil, batteries, and accumulators)2. The leading associations of vehicle 
manufacturers created the Spanish Association for the Environmental Treatment of ELV (SIGRAUTO) to collect 
and manage ELVs3.  
 Royal Decree 110/2015, on WEEE and Royal Decree 20/2017 on ELVs, was intended to transfer responsibility 
for managing waste oil in WEEE and ELV from the lubricant manufacturer to manufacturers of EEE vehicles, 
respectively. Consequently, Royal Decree 110/2015 and Royal Decree 20/2017 established relationships between the 
PROs for waste oil, WEEE, and ELV. This paper aims to examine the relationships in the performance of the PROs 
mentioned above by estimating the cointegration equations among the variables SIG, EEE, and VP using dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS). Subsequently, the elasticities between these variables are shown. The period 
considered is 2007-2019, and the data are quarterly. 
According to the results, SIG and EEE were cointegrated variables; however, SIG and VP were not cointegrated 
variables. The elasticity of SIG up to EEE was positive at 2, 4156 and to VP at 2, 4050. Moreover, the variables of 
vehicle registration (VR) and SIG are cointegrated. The paper also suggests that results were a consequence that EPR 
was applied in WEEE PRO join with a deposit refund system (DRS); meanwhile, regarding EPR in ELV PRO, in 
last years, the automotive sector had not benefited from aid to purchase cars.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of economic literature. Section 3 
shows the main characteristics of the PROs for waste oil, WEEE, and ELV; meanwhile, section 4 refers to economic 
incentives. Sections 5 is about the methodology. Section 6 and 7 contain the results and conclusions, respectively. 
 
2. Review of Economic Literature 
Economic incentives play a crucial role in achieving waste prevention and waste management objectives, even 
when EPR is established. In the PROs studied, other economic incentive policies such as taxes or subsidies are 
applied along with EPR. Subsequently, the literature is initially reviewed regarding the efficiency of economic 
incentive policies and their application to EPR. The following section is about the literature review of the PROs for 
waste oil, WEEE, and ELV.  
 
2.1. The Efficiency of Economic Incentive Policies 
Various studies on market instruments, other than EPR, to reduce the amount of waste to be disposed of 
concluding that an SDR or combination of a product tax and a recycling subsidy is the most efficient policy (Dinan, 
1993; Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995; Fullerton and Wolverton, 2000; Palmer and Walls, 1997;1999; Sigman, 1995). 
Calcott and Walls (2005), point out that an SDR and a final elimination tax promote recycling design4. Some authors 
have discussed whether these policies are consistent with EPR. According to Palmer and Walls (1999), the SDR is 
consistent with EPR programs under perfect competition. Tsai  et al. (2013), pointed out that even if the market is 
imperfectly competitive, the SDR is consistent with EPR. Regarding the recycled material standard (EMR), Walls 
(2006), notes that this policy is consistent with EPR regimes. If EMR is applied to the industry, rather than 
individually by producers, it confers flexibility and reduces costs (Palmer  et al., 1995). Overall, the optimal recycled 
content of the entire supply chain may be a function of the parties' bargaining power to determine the sustainability 
level achieved by recycling (Geda  et al., 2020). 
According to Runkel (2003), under imperfect competition, EPR causes welfare losses because it does not 
consider imperfection due to producers' market power. Fleckinger and Glachant (2010), subsequently show that EPR 
individual programs are not an optimal solution, as each EPR program introduces a new risk of collusion and 
highlights the need to regulate the fees that finance PRO activities. Additionally, the product is relevant in the 
markets where EPR is established (cars, household appliances, food), and the quality of the product affects waste 
management costs.  From the perspective of the organization of PROs, Kunz  et al. (2018) point out that different 
PROs for a waste improve efficiency and reduce producer costs. However, collective systems also involve some 
                                                             
2 Royal Decree 1619/2005 of 30 December regulates the management of out of use tires. Tire producers constitute SIGNUS 
(Integrated Management System of Tires Off-use) and TNU (Management of Used Tires). EPR regime for batteries and 
accumulators is outlined in Directive 2006/66/EC on batteries and accumulators (repeal Directive 91/157/CEE), which Royal 
Decree transposed 106/2008 of 1 February, on batteries and accumulators and the environmental management of their waste. 
3 Spanish Association of Automobile and Truck Manufacturers (ANFAC), National Association of Importers of Automobile, 
Truck, Bus and Motorcycle Importers (ANIACAM), currently integrated into ANFAC, Spanish Association of Scrap Yards and 
Automotive Recycling (AEDRA), and the Spanish Federation of Recovery and Recycling (FER). 
4 The green design has been defined as the process in which environmental attributes are considered for product design objectives 
Fullerton and Wu (1998). Policies for Green Design. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36(2): 131-48. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1998.1044. According to Eichner and Pethig (2001). Product Design and Efficient Management of 
Recycling and Waste Treatment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 41(1): 109-34. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1126, a waste material's content increases recycling productivity and promotes efficient design. 
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disadvantages. Some PROs compete in Europe to allocate WEEE to achieve economies of scale and even buy in the 
WEEE market to meet their obligations. These disadvantages can be solved by a central coordination mechanism 
(clearing house) that allocates waste for each PRO proportionately to its members' market share.  
 
2.2. Economic Research in PROs for Waste Oil WEEE, and ELV 
Assessing the efficiency of different policies to promote waste oil regeneration shows that an EMR is more 
efficient than a subsidy or a tax (Arner  et al., 2005; Arner  et al., 2006). Subsequently, it has been noted that 
SIGAUS constitutes an EMR applied to the lubricant sector (Arner, 2017a). Royal Decree 679 of 2 June 2006 on the 
management of industrial waste oils has been studied using a vector error correction model for the dynamic effects 
that the ecological objectives established have on the quantity of waste oils intended for regeneration and the price of 
base lubricating oils (Arner, 2017b). The existence of different PROs involved in the management of waste oil 
(SIGAUS, WEEE, ELV) has led to an increase in the efficiency of waste management, reducing the unit cost of 
management and driving the increase in the amount of waste oil collected and valued by the treatment of 
regeneration and combustion (Arner, 2018). This paper expands the study of competition in waste oil PRO to WEEE 
and ELV PRO. 
The recycling of some materials contained in WEEE and ELV, such as iron, aluminum, and copper, has been 
analyzed from policies to promote recovery and recycling (Anderson and Spiegelman, 1977; Blomberg and Hellmer, 
2000; Evans and Lewis, 2005; Fisher  et al., 1972; Slade, 1980; Suslow, 1986). According to Andersson  et al. 
(2019), recycling these materials in WEEE and ELV PROs works appropriately. Additionally, the recycling of some 
precious metals, such as gold, palladium, or silver, contained in WEEE is currently high. However, the recycling of 
these materials contained in ELV is restricted by the composition of the materials, the design for recycling 
legislation, capabilities, and business models of the recycling industry. In turn, the recycling of some smaller metals, 
gallium, and titanium, contained in both WEEE and ELV, requires, in the long term, both nationally and 
internationally, the development of new value chains. For Nakamura  et al. (2012), the recycling of ferrous metals 
from ELV in uses other than this sector (open-loop recycling) is expected because the mixing of different types of 
metals in these residues determines that the quality of the resulting products does not reach the quality of the primary 
materials. 
In the ELV PRO, it is common for EPR to apply in conjunction with other economic incentives, such as 
recycling fees (Netherlands) or a subsidy (Sweden). Mazzanti and Zoboli (2006), discuss how these instruments 
encourage innovation in design for recycling at different manufacturing stages, affecting economic agents from 
various industries. Besides, Forslind (2008) examines the relationship between the number of ELV recovered and the 
government subsidies in Sweden and concludes that the efficiency of EPR increases if combined with economic 
incentives to deliver ELV to an authorized center. Inghels  et al. (2016), study the factors that determine the quantity 
and composition of authorized recycling centers for ELV to meet the objectives of Directive 2000/53/EC on ELV in 
Belgium, highlighting the need to increase innovation in plastic recovery. 
WEEE PROs are studied from the perspective of reverse logistics options to increase the collection ratio and the 
expected benefits from life cycle analyses (Atasu and Van Wassenhove, 2012; Wang  et al., 2015). Some authors 
consider the recycling ratios established to be arbitrary in this sector and respond to interest groups (Atasu  et al., 
2009; Atasu and Van Wassenhove, 2012). Chen  et al. (2019), provide an instrument to the regulator setting WEEE 
recycling targets, considering that producer responsibility will incentivize the design that facilitates recycling 
products. Also, Esenduran  et al. (2016), establishing a collection ratio in EPR programs in WEEE, including 
recycled products, discourages recycling. If e-waste recycling has a net profit, EPR does not necessarily have 
environmental and economic benefits (Esenduran  et al., 2019). According to these authors, it largely depends on the 
competitive dynamics o e-waste acquisition and the added value generated by different parties involved in the 
processing of e-waste. 
The comparison between individual responsibility systems (IRS) or collective responsibility systems (CRS) for 
WEEE is ambivalent, no definitive. Atasu and Subramanian (2012), point out that while IRS provides a reduction in 
recovery costs, because of the recycling design incentives it introduces, greater efficiency is achieved by CRS in the 
operating costs of these organizations. However, these results depend significantly on the degree of competition in 
the markets (product differentiation) and recovery costs. Toffel  et al. (2008), comparing the efficiency of IRS and 
CRS, point out that while CRS achieves lower costs by obtaining economies of scale, they introduce fewer recycling 
design incentives. 
 
3. PROs for Waste Oil, WEEE and ELV  
In 2019, waste oils subject to different EPR regulations (Royal Decree 679/2006, Royal Decree 110/2015, Royal 
Decree 20/2017) represented 82.29% of the industrial oils marketed up to 354,435 tons, excluding exports of 
vehicles and electrical and electronic equipment. The remaining 17.21% corresponds to greases, marine and aviation 
oils, and process oils. Since it entered operation, SIGAUS has changed its market share, mainly since Royal Decree 
110/2015 and Royal Decree 20/2017 entered into force5. In 2020, the market share assumed by SIGAUS is 87.06%, 
which includes 84.21% for industrial oils marketed by their commitments and 2.85% for the percentage of 
unidentified producers (Table 1).  
 
 
                                                             
5 Market studies conducted by the independent consultant PwC. 
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Table-1. Industrial oil market in 2020 without exports 
Adhering to SIGAUS 84.21% 
Free riders 2.85% 
Market share assumed by SIGAUS 87.06% 
Adhering to SIGPI* 6.53% 
Automotive Import** 0.52% 
Royal Decree 110/2015 WEEE 0.66% 
Royal Decree 20/2017 ELV 5.24% 
* Integrated Independent Producer Management System. 
**Imports for vehicles not included in RD 20/2017, not affiliated with any integrated management system. 
Source: SIGAUS (2020b) 
 
Simultaneously, SIGAUS carried out new actions to increase cover waste management with greater efficiency 
and flexibility. In 2016, SIGAUS established the variable payment of collections according to the geographical 
locations where they took place, assigning each Spanish municipality to one of 4 zones depending on its distance to 
the existing management centers and the volume of waste generated in the previous year, two variables of significant 
impact on the cost of collection (SIGAUS, 2018). Moreover, SIGAUS established additional compensation linked to 
the international price of lubricant bases (ICIS) to modulate financing according to this crucial indicator's evolution.  
In 2017, new actions were expanded with the monthly update of the amounts paid following the evolution of the 
leading indicators of petroleum derivatives (ICIS, for lubricants, and PLATTS for fuel oils) and with the quarterly 
reviews of imbalances defined in the cost study, based on information provided by management companies on the 
purchase and sale of waste oil and sale of products from it. This linkage allows a continuous adaptation of financing 
to market variations, injecting more financing into the management industry at times of low demand for treated 
waste oil, or reducing it in periods of best sales.  
The above measures led to a reduction in the average cost of managing waste oil (Figure 1), which between 
2016 and 2018 was by 42.49%, from 142 €/ton to 81.66 €/ton (SIGAUS, 2019). In 2019, it raised to 101 €/t because 
of the end of cycle 2013-2019 (SIGAUS, 2020b). Besides, new actions from SIGAUS also contributed to the 
recovery of the amount of lubricating oil placed on the market (Figure 2) and the amount of oil recovered through 
the regeneration and energy recovery (Figure 3). In turn, in 2019, all these variables decreased. 
Regarding WEEE, the Ministry for Ecological Transition set the state and regional minimum annual separate 
collection targets, payable for domestic and professional WEEE, by the minimum target of 65% of the EEE weight 
placed in the three preceding market years (Figure 4)6. That objective is transferred to each EEE PRO according to 
the market share of its associated producers7. The objective by weight of the EEE or WEEE, to avoid possible 
double financing, does not include removable batteries, which must be extracted for proper management. To 
calculate the recovery objectives, the treatments to which the waste oils contained in the WEEE are subjected. 
Besides, non-removable batteries and accumulators are to be included8. 
Royal Decree 110/2015 establishes a single electronic information collection tool (Electronic Platform) in force 
since 2019, directly recording the data of the WEEE for collection and management, co-financed by the Ministry for 
Ecological Transition, which pays 55% of this (through voluntary contributions from Regional Governments) and by 
the manufacturers who contribute the remaining 45%. The electronic platform optimizes the effort of operators and 
avoids certain distortions generated by the multiplicity of platforms. In turn, the Collection Allocation Office (named 
OfiRaee), managed directly by the EEE producers, based on the information derived from the electronic platform, 
aims to make compulsory assignments throughout the nation to extended liability systems, based on territorial 
spaces, to collect and manage WEEE from local entities and distributors' collection facilities. Royal Decree 
110/2015 also introduces an obligation for large distributors with a sales area of more than 400 mm to accept the 
collection of small WEEE (mobile phones) without the obligation to purchase an equivalent. These obligations are 
maintained in the sale of EEE through the Internet. 
In Spain, the automotive sector is characterized by exported production of more than 80%. Subsequently, EPR is 
applied to less than 20% of vehicle production (Figure 5). Since its foundation, SIGRAUTO has established a 
collection network that guarantees the vehicle's free delivery by the last user for its recovery and reuse treatment 
(Figure 6). It has organized a network of authorized treatment centers (ATCs), which reaches 569 in 2019, and 
fragmentation facilities. In 2007, the entry fee for the General Vehicle Register of General Direction of Traffic was 
removed if the delivery is to an ATC, and it is not carried out by transfer to another country. Besides, since 2008, 
electronic decontaminated vehicle certificates have been regulated9. 
                                                             
6 Royal Decree 208/2005 establishing the EPR of EEE producers set a separate WEEE collection target from 4 kg 
households/inhabitant/year and the obligation to achieve separate WEEE collection targets and recycling and recovery targets for 
each type of WEEE, differentiating 10 WEEE categories. 
7
 Royal Decree 219/2013 of 22 March on restrictions on the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic 
equipment transposes Directive 2011/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2011 on restrictions on the use 
of certain hazardous substances in the electric and electronic equipment production.  
8 Battery producers and accumulators have adhered to different PROs (ECOPILAS, ERP, ECO/WEEE'S, ECOLEC) and, in 
another case, are part of SERNAUTO (Spanish Association of Automotive Equipment and Component Manufacturers). 
9  Ministerial Order INT/624/2008, of 26 February, repeals Ministerial Order INT/249/2004, which established an obligation to 
present the certificate of destruction of the vehicle in an ATC. 
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Royal Decree 20/2017 established that the total percentage of preparation for reuse and recovery should be at 
least 95% of the average weight per vehicle per year, and the total percentage of preparation for reuse and recycling 
shall be at least 85% of the average weight per vehicle per year (Figure 7). Moreover, the ATCs, from 1 February 
2017, will recover for their preparation for reusing the market parts and components of vehicles involving at least 
5% of the total weight of the vehicles they treat annually. From 1 January 2021, this percentage shall be 10%, and 
from 1 January 2026, this percentage shall be 15% of the total weight of the vehicles they treat annually.  
 
4. Economic Incentives 
Law 16/2013 of 29 October includes a tax on HFC's consumption, PFC, and SF6 gases contained WEEE
10. The 
tax is an incentive to deliver WEEE to an authorized manager because taxpayers can deduct the fees from the tax 
paid concerning fluorinated greenhouse gases that they prove to have delivered to authorized waste managers for 
destruction, recycling, or regeneration. Taxpayers must register their facilities in the Territorial Register of 
Greenhouse Fluorinated Gas Tax, which assists in registering WEEE producers11. 
In Spain, the volume of treated ELV has mainly depended on the aid programs for the renovation of car parks12. 
According to SIGRAUTO (2020), in the year in which there was not a renovation program (PREVER 1997-2007, 
Innovative Vehicle, Green Vehicle (VIVE) 2008-2010 or 2000E 2009-2010), passenger cars treated falling 
approximately of 200,000 units. The PREVER Program established a deduction of the Registration Tax of 480.81 
euros to purchase new and used vehicles. It supposed the increase of 3,34 million car sales and the saving of 4,2 
million tons of CO2. The VIVE program financed up to 10,000 euros without interest, while the 2000E program 
granted 1,500 euros for the purchase of a new car or VO of fewer than five years. These programs came to finance 
and reward of 551,439 sales. Moreover, vehicle-renewal programs' existence or absence has significantly affected 
the average age of vehicle park13. 
Since 1 January 2008, the Registration Tax has been amended by applying tax rates based on official CO2 
emissions and changing the heading of vehicles in which it falls from the previous criterion relating to the 
displacement of vehicles14. The Law 51/2002, of 27 December, reform of Law 39/1988, of 28 December, Regulator 
of Local Finances, established a tax of up to 75% on mechanical traction vehicles power-making tax benefits for 
municipalities, depending on the type of fuel that the vehicle consumes, and the characteristics of its engines and its 
impact on the environment.  
Currently, due to decarbonization targets and air quality regulations in cities, the vehicle landscape is involved 
in a transition toward greater fuel efficiency and an increased percentage of alternative energy vehicles in the 
production mix and sales (ANFAC, 2020b). According to the Regulation (EU) 2019/631, setting binding emission 
reduction targets and vans for new registrations, from 1 January 2020, CO2 emission will be with an average of 95 
grams of CO2 per km traveled for passenger cars, reducing by 15% and 37.5% from 2025 and 2030, respectively 
(Figure 8). In Spain, using electric vehicles involves using renewable energy sources to improve the electricity 
system's overall efficiency.  
The Incentive Programs for Efficient Vehicle Incentives (2010-2014), PIVE, and MOVELE (Table 2) consist of 
subsidies that are provided equally by the Industry Ministry and the manufacturer or point of sale (2,000 or 3,000 
euros in the case of large families). These incentive programs have helped promote the acquisition of nearly 10,000 
electric vehicles, avoiding over their lifetime the emission of 150,000 tons of CO2 and saving in that same period 
300,000 barrels of oil. Since 2016, from the Vehicle Boost Strategy with Alternative Energies (2014-2020), aid has 
been aimed at the acquisition of alternative energy vehicles (MOVEA and MOVALT vehicles program), and the 
implementation of electric vehicle charging points (MOVALT infrastructure program)15. In 2019, MOVES Program 
funded regional governments to implement electric vehicle recharging infrastructure or purchase alternative 
vehicles16. 
                                                             
10 Law 16/2013 of 29 October, set down specific environmental tax measures, and adopted other tax and financial measures.    
11 In 2014, the tax rates payable were 33%, while in 2015 and 2016, they were 66%. In 2017, the first year in which the tax is 
fully implemented, revenue increased by 26.67% compared with 2016. 
12 National and local single-purchase aid, and state-level tax exemptions on vehicle registration and operation are standard 
instruments applied in cities with a high deployment of electric vehicles such as Amsterdam, Oslo, and Rotterdam-The Hague. In 
markets that have not addressed cost barriers in purchasing cars or property tax, such as Brussels or Madrid, they generally 
experience a slower deployment of electric vehicles (ICCT, 2020). 
13 In 2007, after several years with renovation programs, the vehicle park's average age was 8 years, reflecting car sales' good 
performance. Since 2012, the crisis's effects and the lack of effective park renovation programs supposed the vehicle park's 
average age increased to 10.5 years. In 2017, the economic recovery allowed for more purchases of new vehicles; however, the 
absence of renovation programs has led to the maintenance of most vehicles sold more than ten years ago, placing the average age 
of the park at 12 years (SIGRAUTO, 2019). 
14 Currently if the autonomous communities have not approved different ones, the enrollment tax rates set according to the 
official CO2 emissions of the vehicle are 0% if they are less than 120 g/km; 4.75% if they range from 120 g/km to 160 g/km; 
9.75% if they range from 160 g/km to 200 g/km and 14.75% if emissions are more significant than 200 g/km or for vehicles that 
are not required to measure their emissions. 
15 In 2016 and 2017, Mobility Boost Programs with Alternative Energy Vehicles (MOVEA), with a 16.6 million budget and 14.26 
million, respectively. In 2018, MOVALT Vehicles Program, to incentivize alternative vehicles' acquisition, had a budget of 20 
million euros, and the MOVALT Infrastructure Program (Incentive Program for implementing electric vehicle recharging 
infrastructure) had a budget of 20 million. 
16 Efficient and Sustainable Mobility Incentives Program (MOVES). The budget for this program was 45 million euros. 
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Currently, MOVES II Program, funded by 100 million euros, provides subsidies for alternative energy vehicles, 
even electric vehicles17. Besides, Royal Decree-Law 25/2020 sets subsidies up to 250 million euros to purchase any 
vehicle, even gasoline or diesel vehicles. However, they will be CERO emissions, ECO, or C category for gasoline 
and diesel vehicles; in conventional vehicles, they must be A or B category in the IDAE Base Date of Carburates and 
CO2 emissions
18. Also, car sellers apply a discount equal to the state aid up to 1,000 euros. 
 
Table-2. Electric vehicle incentive programs 
Program Date Budget (M) Records Average age (years) 
PIVE September 2012 75 72,227 17.29 
PIVE 2  January 2013  150 148,657 17.03 
PIVE 3  July 2013  70 68,488 16.91 
PIVE 4  October 2013  70 69,141 16.99 
PIVE 5  January 2014  175 171,356 16.69 
PIVE 6  June 2014  317 315,839 18.27 
PIVE 7  February 2015  39,5 36,646 16.75 
PIVE 8  May 2015  225 290,675 17.34 
MOVELE 2014 6/6/2014 10 1,456 -- 
MOVELE 2015 18/4/2015 7 1,191 -- 
Source: IDAE (2019) 
 
5. Data and Methods 
5.1. Data Description 
The relationship between the PROs for waste oil, WEEE, and ELV is explored using the variable production 
because it is as a consequence of the responsibility for the waste oil in WEEE and ELV being transferred, 
respectively, from the lubricant manufacturer to the manufacturer of electrical and electronic equipment, as well as 
to the automobile manufacturer. Consequently, the variable used for the waste oil PRO is SIG: lubricating oil from 
associated producers in SIGAUS. Quarterly data were obtained from SIGAUS publications 
www.Sigaus.es/publicaciones (various years). For WEEE PRO, EEE is the variable used in 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products; manufacture 
of electrical equipment, volume index of production, base 100 = 2015, seasonally and calendar adjusted data). 
The variable used for automobile production is VP, in https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (manufacture 
of motor vehicles, volume index of production, base 100 = 2015, seasonally and calendar adjusted data). Moreover, 
the variable VR is used in http://aniacam.com/. In turn, the results have been compared using vehicle production 
(VP) and vehicle sales (VR). 
 
5.2. The Order of Integration of the Variables SIG, WEEE, and ELV 
The order of integration of variables is evaluated using the statistic Augmented-Dickey Fuller t-statistical (ADF) 
and the Schwarz information criterion19. Ho is the existence of a unit root in all cases20. The main conclusions are 
obtained using variables in second differences (Table 3). Subsequently, cointegration relationships between these 
variables are estimated. According to the results, the variables involved in the PROs for waste oil, WEEE, and ELV, 
in second differences, have a unit root. Therefore, the cointegration relationships between those variables are 
explored. In the end, the estimation of a cointegrating equation using DOLS in single time series settings for the 
variables SIG, WEEE, and ELV allows us to obtain the elasticities between cointegrated variables. In turn, that 













                                                             
17 Royal Decree 569/2020, of 16 June, which regulates the incentives program for efficient and sustainable mobility. 
18 Royal Decree-Law 25/2020, of 3 July, approving urgent measures for economics and employment reactivation. 
19 According to Engle and Granger (1987). Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing. 
Econometrica, 552: 251-76. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913236, it is of interest to examine if a group of variables is cointegrated. It 
is because of their economic implications and if that relationship is stable in the long run. If there is a stationary linear 
combination of two or more non-stationary variables, that stationary linear combination is called a cointegration equation.  
20. The test for determining the order of integration of variables, Augmented-Dickey Fuller t-statistic (ADF), can be seen in 
Maddala and Kim,(1999)  
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Table-3. Augmented-Dickey Fuller t-statistical AIC information criterion (second differences) 
Variables Critical values t-statistics p-value 
SIG 1% level -2,6225 -6,0550 0.0000 
  5% level -1,9490   
 10% level -1,6118   







VR 1% level -3,6104 -4,4160 0.0011 
  5% level -2,9389   
 10% level -2,6079   
VP 1% level -3,6104 -4,9033 0.0003 






5.3. Estimating Cointegration Equations for SIG, EEE, and VP Variables 
Subsequently, estimates of cointegration equations for EEE, VP, and SIG are shown, using DOLS. The number 
of delays and advances is chosen using the Akaike information criterion. Data are quarterly for the period 2007-
2019. Variables in all equations are defined in logarithms.  
The proposed cointegration function is for the variables SIG, EEE, and VP, considering responsibility for waste 
oil in WEEE and ELV is transferred from lubricating oil producer to EEE and vehicle producers as follows: 
SIG = f (EEE)                                                                                                                              (1) 
SIG = f (VP)                                                                                                                              (2) 
Moreover, the expected sign of the coefficient of the EEE and VP variable will be positive in Equations 1 and 2.  
Finally, the cointegrating equations for estimation, with L being the logarithmic notation of the variables, were 
as follows: 
LSIGt = β1 LEEEt + ս1t                                                                                                                (3) 
LSIGt = β2 VPt + ս2t                                                                                                                (4) 
where ս1t and ս2t constitute a white noise error term. 
 
5.4. Estimating Cointegration Equations for SIG and VR Variables 
This section shows the results of estimating cointegrating equations between SIG and VR variables. The 
estimate is made using DOLS, choosing the number of delays and advances using the Akaike information criterion. 
Data are quarterly for the period 2007-2019. Variables in all equations are defined in logarithms. 
In this case, the proposed cointegration function for the variables SIG and VR; thus, the responsibility for waste 
oil in ELV is transferred from the lubricating oil producer to the vehicle producer as follows: 
SIG = f (VR)                                                                                                                             (5) 
The expected sign of the coefficient of the VR variable will be positive in Equation 5. 
Finally, according to the results, the cointegrating equation to estimate, with L being the logarithmic notation of 
the variables, follows: 
LVRt = α + β3 LSIGt + ս3t                                                                                                                                                  (6) 
where ս3t constitutes a white noise error term. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Cointegrating Equation 3 and 4 
The results of estimating Equations 3 and 4 (Table 4) were satisfactory enough concerning the model 
explanatory capacity (R2). Moreover, the individual significance of β1 and β2 was accepted. In turn, there was a 
cointegrating equation for LSIG and LEE and LSIG and LVP. Subsequently, other characteristics of the error term 
are showed21. In Equations 3 and 4, under the Jarque-Bera statistic, the null hypothesis that the residues are 
distributed by a multivariate normal distribution was accepted at the significance level of 5%. According to the 
statistic Q, the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation, at the significance level of 5%, is accepted in delay 
3 in Equation 3. Besides, it was rejected in delay number 2 in Equation 4 at the same level of significance. 
Subsequently, cointegrating equations estimated was appropriate from estimation, although there was autocorrelation 
in the error term, particularly in Equation 4. 
Finally, it was corroborated that the variables were effectively cointegrated through the statistical t for the 
performance of the Engle-Granger test of cointegration, contrasting whether the residues in the cointegration 
equation were stationary. Moreover, the statistical z for that test was used, including, in this case, autocorrelation in 
the error term. According to the Engle-Granger tau-statistic and z-statistic test, the Ho hypothesis was rejected, that 
the variables are not cointegrated, at the significance level of 5% in Equation 3. Subsequently, the stochastic 
structure of variables was consistent enough. However, Ho was accepted in Equation 4. Consequently, that 
cointegrating relationship could not be stable in time and be merely spurious in Equation 4.    
                                                             
21 Other characteristics of the error term were analyzed according to Novales,(2010) . 
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Table-4. Estimates equations 3 and 4 
Dependent variable: LSIG (9, 10) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
LEEE 2,4156 927,8622 0,0000 
R2= 0,8169 
R2 adjusted = 0,4842 
Jarque-Bera test Statistical P-value 








Engle-Granger t statistics 




















Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the number of advances and delays, respectively. 
 
The coefficient β1 of 2, 4156 constituted the elasticity of LSIG to LEEE in Equation 3. Because using DOLS, β1 
was a long-term elasticity, with delays and advantages equal to 9 and 10. In the management of waste oil, because of 
the existence of different PROs, different actions have been established to manage waste oil more efficiently and 
flexibly (variable payment based on its distance to the refunds centers and the volume generated in the previous year, 
financing was monthly adapting to market evolution). These actions have meant the reduction of the unit cost of 
management from 142 €/ton to 81.66 €/ton. Moreover, 2015-2018 was accompanied by an increase in lubricant 
consumption and waste oils managed by SIGAUS between 2016-2018. In turn, all these variables decreased in 2019 
as a result of the end of the cycle.  
Besides, several actions have been introduced to facilitate more efficient waste management in WEEE PRO 
(OfiRaee, the electronic platform for WEEE management). Other actions have also been put in place to facilitate the 
collection of small WEEE (mobile phones) and the collection of WEEE in the sale of EEE via the Internet. In this 
case, the fully implemented greenhouse gas tax since 2017, and an incentive to deliver fluorinated gases to an 
authorized manager also influence the evolution of the WEEE collected. Besides, the amount collected from WEEE 
increased since 2015, as EEE on the market did, but it decreased in 2019.  
In Equation 4, the coefficient β2 of 2, 4250 was the elasticity of LSIG up to LVP. Moreover, β2 constituted the 
long-term elasticity of LSIG up to LVP, with the number of delays and advantages of 10 and 9. Since 2016 vehicle 
production decreased, except in 2019. Consequently, it occurs the opposite of lubricating oil. Last decade, vehicle 
production was linked exclusively to the promotion of less polluting vehicles, which estimated that low-emissions 
vehicles' acquisition reached up to 10.000 vehicles. However, diesel and gasoline vehicles had not received any 
subsidies. Moreover, since 2016, subsidies were not available for electric cars. Meanwhile, treated ELV increased 
since 2016, according to the more ambitious objectives of the recovery and recycling of ELV were established. 
Consequently, the absence of any economic incentive to vehicles manufacturer, opposite to WEEE, could determine 
that LSIG and LVP were not cointegrated variables. It was important because ELV PRO is responsible for the 5,24% 
of waste oil and WEEE of the 0,66%.  
 
6.2. Cointegrating Equation 6 
The estimating Equation 6 (Table 5) results were satisfactory concerning the model explanatory capacity (R2). 
Moreover, the individual significance of all coefficients in the cointegrating equation was accepted. Regarding other 
characteristics of the error term, under the Jarque-Bera t statistics, the residues were distributed by a multivariate 
normal distribution at the significance level of 5%. However, according to the Q statistics, there was no 
autocorrelation in the error term at the significance level of 5%. Besides, under the Engle-Granger tau-statistic and z-
statistic test, the Ho hypothesis was rejected, that the variables were not cointegrated, at the significance level of 5%. 






Dependent variable: LSIG (10, 9) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
LPV 2,4250 1046,7130 0,0000 
R2 = 0,9254 
R2 adjusted = 0,7898 
Jarque-Bera test Statistical P-value 
 0,9854 0,6109 
Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box 
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Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the number of advances and delays, respectively. 
 
The coefficient β3 of 3,9012 was the value of the elasticity of LVR up to LSIG in Equation 5. Moreover, using 
DOLS, β3 constituted the long-term elasticity of the LVR up to LSIG variable, with the number of delays and 
advantages equal to 8 and 9, respectively. Besides, vehicle registration, as lubricating oil had increased since 2016, 
although it decreased in 2019. Since 2008, the Registration Tax has been amended by applying tax rates according to 
official CO2 emissions and the vehicle classification heading to promote less-polluting vehicles. In turn, the sales 
variable (VR) is less representative of EPR in ELV PRO than the production variable (VP) because it supposes 20% 
of vehicle production; besides, regional governments regulate the Registration Tax (Equation 6).  
 
7. Conclusions 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, according to European directives, systems of EPR have been 
established in Spain for waste oil, WEEE, ELV, tires, batteries, and accumulators. These systems have evolved 
towards the more ambitious collection, and treatment goals as previously established ones were achieved. In the 
same way, different measures have been applied to achieve a more efficient operation of PROs. The regulations have 
tended to avoid double regulation and financing of those wastes belonging to more than one PRO, being the 
producer responsible for all the waste generated by the consumption or use. Moreover, the producer is also 
responsible for using the materials obtained from the waste in the production processes. 
RD 110/2015 and RD 20/2017 have set stable and positive interconnections between PROs for waste oil, 
WEEE, and ELV because the producer responsibility for the waste oils contained in the WEEE and ELV is 
transferred from the producer of waste oils to the manufacturer of electric and electronic equipment and vehicles, 
respectively. The main results were obtained regarding LEEE (production of electric and electronic equipment) and 
LSIG (production of lubricating oil) as variables cointegrated. The elasticity of the variable LSIG up to the variable 
LEEE was positive at 2,4166. Additionally, there was a cointegrating equation for LSIG and LVP (vehicle 
production), although they were not cointegrated variables. Besides, the elasticity of the LSIG variable up to the 
LVP was positive at 2,4050. Moreover, regarding ELV PRO, the variables LVR (vehicle registration) and LSIG 
were cointegrated. The elasticity of LVR up to the LSIG was 3,9012. 
Efficiency gains in managing this waste have accompanied the existence of various PROs involved in the 
management of waste oil. These measures have meant the reduction of the unit cost of management and lubricant oil 
managed by SIGAUS from 2016 to 2018. However, it increased in 2019 because of the end of the cycle. Economic 
literature has said that a tax and a subsidy (DRS) combination constitutes the most efficient policy to achieve the 
recovery and recycling objectives. EPR in WEEE PRO is applied with a DRS because of a tax on greenhouse gases 
incentivizing the delivery of WEEE to an authorized manager. Besides, regarding ELV PRO, vehicle registration 
taxes are applied to account for vehicle emissions. However, VR only supposes 20% of the VP variable, and EPR 
affects overall production decisions. Besides, there are no subsidies for deregistering polluting vehicles and 
purchasing new low emissions vehicles. Consequently, the absence of any economic incentive to vehicles 
manufacturer, opposite to WEEE, could determine that LSIG and LVP were not cointegrated. Subsequently, the 
relationship between these variables was not stable, although WEEE PRO is responsible for the 0,66% of waste oil 
and ELV PRO of the 5,24% of waste oil. 
Results were based on the estimation of cointegrating equations between the variables involved in the 
functioning of PROs and, consequently, on long-term relationships. However, results were being autocorrelation in 
the error term. In addition, LSIG and LVP were not cointegrated variables. Subsequently, results may be changed 
because of aid for purchasing all types of vehicles, electric vehicles, diesel, or gasoline vehicles that have been 
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Dependent variable: LVR (8, 9) 









R2 = 0,9671 
R2 adjusted = 0,9048 
Jarque-Bera test Statistical P-value 
 4,2697 0,1182 
Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box 
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Figure-1. Evolution of waste management costs (€/ton) 
 
Source: SIGAUS (2020b), own source) 
 
Figure-2. Evolution of industrial oil put on the market (tons) 
 
Source: SIGAUS (2020a)  
 
Figure-3. Evolution of the quantities of waste oil undergoing different treatments 
 
Source: SIGAUS (2020a)  
 
Figure-4. EEE marketed and WEEE collection (tons) 
 
Source: Eurostat and information from the different integrated management system.  
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Figure-5. Spain vehicle production and exports (number of vehicles) 
 
Source: ANFAC (2020a)  
 
Figure-6. Historical evolution of the number of vehicles treated 
 
Source: SIGRAUTO (2020) 
 
Figure-7. End-of-life vehicle recovery levels (%) 
 
Source: SIGRAUTO (2020)  
 
Figure-8. Average CO2 emissions from the registration of new vehicles 
 
* First quarterly 2020 
Source: (ANFAC (2020a))  
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